The web of biodiversity that the world’s food production depends on is comprised of thousands of species of crops with untold genetic variability.  Since the emergence of farming systems 12,000 years ago the total sum of the world’s plant genetic resources for food and agriculture has vastly expanded. Farmers learned to save the seeds of crops they deemed the easiest to process or store, those that were most likely to survive in harsh growing seasons, or those that simply tasted best. As a result, more than 7,000 species of plants have been cultivated or collected up until the present day.

Many of these crops are important to local communities and family farmers, as a way to achieve food and nutrition security, enhance food sovereignty, preserve biodiversity, maintain cultures and build resilience to climate change and other forms of stress. Seed saving, exchanging, using and selling are a fundamental part of the cultural repertoire of rural communities, especially indigenous peoples. These are customary practices that go beyond national borders. As a result of generations of seed exchanges, peoples and countries have become interdependent as they all rely on genetic resources that have originated elsewhere for food security (1).However, genetic resources are disappearing at an alarming rate. Out of a total of 250,000 known plant species, approximately 7000 (as indicated above) have been used for human food since the origin of agriculture. Out of these, just 12 crop and five animal species provide three quarters of the world’s food today. Across the world, traditional seed diversity and related knowledge are no longer passed on, as farmers are encouraged or pressured to purchase seed.

With the erosion of these resources, farmers and other actors in the food system loose the potential to adapt to new socio-economic and environmental conditions, such as population growth and climate change. Since the emergence of an international plant genetic resources regime in the early 1990s, established in response to these threats, ownership and access to plant species and the genetic potential they have has entered national and international agricultural, trade and environmental agendas. The most significant element of this process has been the debate on the definition and implementation of access and benefit sharing (ABS).

The formal access and benefit sharing regime

To date, only a relatively small number of national governments have tried to design and enact meaningful and effective measures to implement ABS for genetic resources that are clearly farmer-centred. While ABS implementation faces challenges, many institutions, organisations, indigenous peoples and other actors involved in genetic resources conservation are critical of the development of an overly formal ABS system. As this issue of Farming Matters demonstrates, the current system in place globally is considered to be too theoretical, proposed procedures are too bureaucratic and legalistic, and proposed measures are unsupportive of smallholder farming around the world.

The cases presented here also highlight that there are many practical ways in which access and benefit sharing is designed and implemented through collaborative efforts based on the rural realities, knowledge and needs of local communities and farming families. Community seed banks and other forms of seed exchange are effectively putting access and benefit-sharing into practice in a way that enhances the resilience and autonomy of food producers and their farming systems while preserving biodiversity.

The current ABS regime consists of a number of international agreements, the two most important being the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. We summarise these agreements below.

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)

Negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) entered into force on 29 December 1993. The Convention is legally binding, which means that states who signed it are obliged to implement its provisions. So far, 190 countries and the European Community have become members of the CBD. One of the three objectives of the Convention is the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources.

Protection of traditional knowledge: theory

Article 15 of the Convention provides a general framework for the implementation of access and benefit sharing arrangements. As states are considered to have sovereign rights over their biological resources, under the CBD they are the designated authority to determine who has access to genetic resources, and how. Access to genetic resources under the CBD must be based on the two principles. First, free prior informed consent which refers to the idea that the country of origin of the genetic resources (or the country that has acquired these resources under the Convention) has to obtain consent from the providing party- which can be an indigenous or local community- to allow third party use of these resources. Second, the terms of such access are to be ‘mutually agreed’.

A supplementary agreement to the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (2010), provides a legal framework for the effective implementation of benefit sharing. The Protocol was adopted in Japan and has been signed by 92 countries as of 2015.  Throughout the Protocol state sovereignty (as in the CBD) overrules the rights of indigenous peoples and small scale farmers. Most notably, the language used in the Protocol creates a double standard between the rights of indigenous and local communities and those of state parties. The Nagoya Protocol Art. 5 requires that States obtain, under certain circumstances, the consent of the concerned communities (including family farmers) to allow another State access to their traditional knowledge, along with an agreement on a mechanism to share the benefits that may come from the use of that knowledge with the respective community. However, this is turning out to be highly problematic in practice.

Protection of traditional knowledge: practice

As the CBD throughout reaffirms national state sovereignty over genetic resources, there are serious challenges when it comes to protecting the human rights, cultural rights, and specifically indigenous rights of communities who are the custodians and users of genetic resources.  Agriculture and food in particular have characteristics that do not fit into the logic of other types of transactions between state parties. One of the reasons for this discrepancy is that farmers and farming communities have exchanged their crops, and the genes within their crops, since the beginning of agriculture, regardless of states or borders. The CBD leaves no space for these transactions. To date, customary laws can only be recognised under the Protocol when these are ‘in accordance with domestic law’,  which is not the case in many countries. Moreover, free prior and informed consent is not embedded in national law in the majority of countries, and where it is, implementation is often problematic.

This results in a situation where farmer and indigenous communities are not always directly consulted, let alone asked for their consent. It becomes even more complex when the traditional knowledge is already available elsewhere – for instance, in a public database inventory, or through another entity which has already accessed such knowledge. In these circumstances, farmers and indigenous groups can easily be circumvented and outmanoeuvred by governmental parties.

Hence, a lack of power to make use of domestic law, if it is available at all, undermines the rights of indigenous and farming communities to secure benefits from ABS under the CBD. Other than this specific and poorly defined requirement of consent, the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol do not address or even mention Farmers’ Rights (see below).

The Multilateral System of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA)

In the context of global interdependence on plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and in reaction to the state sovereignty-based CBD, a global Multilateral System (MLS) was created in 2001 with the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA). The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA, or ‘the Treaty’) aims to contribute to food security with three specific objectives: the conservation of plant genetic resources; their sustainable use; and the sharing of benefits that are derived from the use of plant genetic resources with the countries where they originated. The Treaty recognises both the necessity of ex situ conservation (through seed banks) and in situ conservation (through on-farm cultivation of rare and traditional varieties) in order to reverse the loss of crop genetic diversity.

Farmers have exchanged their seeds since the beginning of agriculture, regardless of states or borders

The Treaty establishes a system for access and benefit sharing for 64 plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, listed in ‘Annex I’ of the ITPGRFA and selected for their relevance for food security. The logic underpinning the MLS is that it enables these resources to be treated as ‘pooled goods’ without individual owners with whom individual contracts for access and benefit-sharing must be negotiated (as is the case under the CBD). As such, in the MLS benefits resulting from their use do not go back to the provider (one single country) but must be shared with all other states through a multilateral fund. Facilitated access to genetic resources that are included in the MLS is, itself, recognised as a major benefit arising from the use of genetic resources. Other benefits that are to be shared on a ‘fair and equitable’ basis include the exchange of information, access to and transfer of technology, capacity building and the sharing of monetary and other benefits arising from commercialisation.

The resources in the MLS are available to anyone who wants them under a standard contract, i.e. the Standard Material Transfer Agreement. Monetary benefits from these agreements do not flow from users to providers (as in the CBD) but into a multilateral fund – the Benefit Sharing Fund. This fund is also open to direct contributions from the contracting parties, the private sector, non-governmental organisations and others.  However, to date no mandatory payment has been made to the Benefit Sharing Fund.

As of 2015, 136 countries have acceded the Treaty, which means they have to ensure the conformity of national laws, regulations and procedures with their obligations under the Treaty.

Farmers’ Rights

The Treaty Article (9.2) on Farmers’ Rights recognises the enormous contribution that farmers and their communities have made and continue to make to the conservation and development of plant genetic resources. The Article includes the protection of traditional knowledge, and the right to participate equitably in benefit sharing and in national decision making about plant genetic resources. It gives governments the responsibility for implementing these rights.

Treaty Article 9.2 stipulates that: “The Contracting Parties agree that the responsibility for realising Farmers’ Rights, as they relate to PGRFA, rests with national governments. In accordance with their needs and priorities, each Contracting Party should, as appropriate, and subject to its national legislation, take measures to protect and promote Farmers’ Rights, including:

• (a) protection of traditional knowledge relevant to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture;
• (b) the right to equitably participate in sharing bene ts arising from the utilization of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; and
• (c) the right to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on matters related to the conserva- tion and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.”

The decision whether or not to embed these Farmers’ Rights in national law rests with goverments

The decision whether or not to embed these Farmers’ Rights in national law (in particular trade related aspects of intellectual property rights such as UPOV), however, rests with national governments. This process has proven to be dif cult and costly, especially in developing countries where there often is a lack of capacity, expertise, resources and sometimes, political will. Farmer-centred policy measures and legislation exist in a number of countries, such as India and Nepal, as illustrated and discussed in the article ‘Lessons for access and benefit sharing from community seed banks in India’ , but remain problematic. (6) In addition, patents or breeders’ rights may restrict or even prohibit farmers’ access.

The ‘formal’ ABS regime in a deadlock

In summary, progress in the domestic implementation of ABS has been considerably slower than expected, partially due to the difficulties of the complex interface between these two systems: the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. Combined with the system’s bureaucracy and the lack Farmers’ Rights recognition in national law, family farmers have been able to benefit little from the ‘formal’ system.  In addition, agreements on trade related aspects of intellectual property rights also influence the system, limiting the legal space for small farmers and indigenous communities.

At the same time, it should be stressed that access and benefit sharing still is an intrinsic element of the customary community seed saving and exchange initiatives among family farmers and indigenous communities. The following section takes a closer look at these, and the second half of this publication presents three specific case studies.

Access and benefit sharing in community seed banks

Community seed banks store and manage seeds with the aim of providing community members with seeds to use.  As such, they are usually part of farmers’ informal seed systems, in which the various stages of seed management—selection, conservation, exchange and improvement—take place without involvement of or control by research, development or government agencies. As some presented experiences demonstrate, community seed banks can be an effective way to improve access and benefit sharing of important crop diversity. Community seed banks also function as a mechanism to implement farmers’ or indigenous rights, by way of recognition, participation in decision making, benefit sharing and a supportive policy and seed regulatory framework. This approach is highlighted in a several case studies in this publication:Lessons for access and benefit sharing from community seeds bank in India and Access and benefit sharing for family farmers in Zimbabwe.

Community seed bank practices and participatory plant breeding activities build on the existing and mostly informal forms of access and benefit sharing while adding new elements. They are sometimes engaged in participatory plant breeding and variety selection, which can strengthen access to and availability of improved seeds and increase diversity.  In participatory plant breeding , farmers, researchers, local consumers and other actors join forces in a continuous, highly dynamic and complex process of selection and exchange of seeds, interactions between farmers and seed producers , research institutions and, sometimes, with agricultural and health authorities and government officials (see Ecuador case). Benefits are generated throughout the process of collaboration and are shared dynamically and at all times among the diverse actors (see The Netherlands case). Usually started on a small scale, some of these crop improvement practices have evolved into seed production and the sale of new varieties, such as maize in China (see China case ). Usually, local seed production focuses on the crops and varieties that the commercial seed sector does not offer. This kind of activity can contribute to the financing of operations of community seed banks and thus enhance their viability in the long term. Community seed banks thus serve as key local sources and access points of germplasm, allowing farming communities to exchange seeds in a decentralized manner through social networks and organized events, such as diversity fairs and participatory seed exchanges.

Community seed banks sometimes also serve to open up policy space for national ABS regulation. In Nepal, for example, ten seed banks functioned as the designated local institutions to assess whether to provide Prior Informed Consent to bio-prospectors. This was a way to implement the PIC provisions of the Agrobiodiversity Policy of 2007 and the draft ABS Law of 2003. In the Brazilian state of Paraíba a law was approved to legalise the distribution of seeds produced by community seed banks without the formal certification by specialised agencies normally required (see Brazil case). In India, researchers are proposing that village-based seed banks become an integral part of the government’s national seed policies (see India case).

In sum, rather than fulfilling international obligations or legal frameworks, community seed bank systems are embedded in traditional and cultural practices in many different specific circumstances.  Concepts of distributive justice, reciprocity and equity are criteria that guide how benefits from the management and use of land and other resources are shared among community members. Fundamentally, these are the principles that make community seed systems effective for family farmers.

This brings into focus questions such as: What are the main success factors and challenges of both formal and informal ABS-systems for family farmers? What lessons can be drawn from existing practices?  What effective solutions can we develop to make the procedures less bureaucratic and legalistic, while truly enhancing access and benefit sharing for family farmers? Taking experiences from around the world as a starting point, this issue of Farming Matters explores potential answers to these questions.

Notes

1 Koutouki, K. (2011), Nagoya Protocol: Status of Indigenous and Local Communities. Legal Aspects of Sustainable Natural Resources Legal Working Paper Series.
2 Bioversity International (2014), Bioversity International’s 10-year strategy 2014–2024.
3 UN FAO (2010), State of the world’s plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.
4 ‘Regime’ is commonly understood as a system or method of government (Cambridge Dictionary)
5 Ker, C. Loua . S., Sanou, M. (2013), Building a Global Infor- mation System in Support of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. In: Crop Genetic Resources as a Global Commons: Challenges in International Law and Governance. (Halewood, M., López Noriega, I, Loua , S. eds). Routledge pp. 283-309.
6 See e.g.: Shrestha, P., Vernooy, R., Chaudhary, P. (eds. 2012), Community Seed Banks in Nepal: Past, present, future. Pro- ceedings of a National Workshop, 14-15 June 2012, Pokhara, Nepal.
7 Adapted from: Vernooy, R., Sthapit, B., Galluzzi, G. and Shrestha, P. (2014), The Multiple Functions and Services of Community Seed banks. In: Resources 2014:3, pp. 636-656.
8 Vernooy, R. (2003), Seeds That Give: Participatory Plant Breed- ing. International Development Research Centre. Ottawa, Canada.
9 Shrestha, P., Vernooy, R., Chaudhary, P. (eds. 2012), Commu- nity Seed Banks in Nepal: Past, present, future. Proceedings of a National Workshop, 14-15 June 2012, Pokhara, Nepal.

Robin Pistorius (pistorius@facts-of-life.nl) is an independent consultant and guest lecturer at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

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Could access and benefit sharing make farmer seed systems stronger?

One focus of the discussion on access is the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA, see article Theory and practice) and its recognition of the right for farmers to save, exchange or sell farm saved seeds. However, if access is prohibited or restricted, for example by patents or breeders’ rights, farmers will not be able to develop or adapt the crop varieties that could help their communities survive in changing climate conditions.

Therefore it is mostly access that could strengthen farmer seed systems, even if there is no benefit sharing. It is crucial for the seed autonomy of farmers, as well as for national development, that access to seeds is guaranteed and not hindered by regulations or intellectual property issues. This is especially true in relation to climate change, since access to genetic resources is fundamental for the development of resilient varieties.

Could you say more about the challenges related to benefit sharing?

Nevertheless, there are some good examples of how the rather small amounts which have been distributed by the Benefit Sharing Fund so far have been supportive of farmer seed systems.

Examples include participatory plant breeding in Iran, the Potato Park in Peru and farmers’ breeding programmes in Southeast Asia. The goal of the ongoing revision is therefore to enhance the mandatory payments by users which, according to the Treaty ‘should flow primarily, directly and indirectly, to farmers in all countries, especially in developing countries, and countries with economies in transition, who conserve and sustainably utilise plant genetic resources for food and agriculture’.

What are your concrete proposals to improve the benefit sharing system for family farmers?

If the goal is that benefits should be shared, in the sense that companies that use the genetic resources that have been developed by farmers will give something back to these farmers, then the benefit sharing system under the Treaty could be a thousand times simpler.

Under the current Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA) and Treaty Art. 6.7, companies only share benefits when they commercialise a new variety that incorporates material accessed from the multilateral system and when the new variety derived from material supplied through the multilateral system is not freely accessible by other parties (companies, research centres) for further research and breeding due to intellectual property rights. Besides, even in the (not yet existing) case of a mandatory payment, it will occur only ten years after the initial access. But the accessed genetic resource has to be traced back through the whole breeding process in order to allow for benefit sharing.

The Berne Declaration, together with stakeholders from the Swiss seed sector, proposes that if companies want to have access to genetic resources under the multilateral system, which to a large extent have been developed by farmers, they should contribute a fixed benefit sharing payment on an annual basis. This could be a certain percentage of their annual seed sales, say 0.2%. Payments will be directed to the benefit sharing fund.

This access and payment system would be like a ‘library fee’, and be much less bureaucratic. There would be no need to trace the genetic contribution of the accessed genetic resources. This proposal could be seen as a further development of the current Art. 6.11 of the SMTA, which asks for payments of 0.5% of the sales of seeds belonging to the same crop as the genetic resource accessed under the MLS. If a party accesses a wheat variety, they will pay 0.5% of the wheat sales based on the resulting variety. Art 6.11 was introduced in the text of the SMTA at the end of negotiations in 2006 by the African delegation. It therefore is commonly referred to as the ‘African proposal’. Although users have the option to choose between payment modes either under Art. 6.7 of the SMTA or under Art. 6.11, nobody has chosen 6.11 so far. This shows that it is crucial that a revised benefit sharing system has only one payment modality. As long as there is also an option which allows for access without any obligation for benefit sharing, the option which effectively would implement mandatory payments will not be used.

It should be noted though, that the ‘library fee’ system does not represent a voluntary payment. Its advantage lies in the fact that it would avoid the task of monitoring the contribution of accessed varieties to the (ultimately) commercial marketing of varieties. It would certainly enhance the mandatory payments to the Benefit Sharing Fund.

How do formal and informal seed systems relate to each other?

The formal and informal seed sectors are interdependent. On the one hand, the Treaty, the Nagoya protocol and the overall ABS regime enable companies to access the pool of genetic resources developed by farmers. This is the biodiversity that is so crucial for further research and breeding. On the other hand, farmers need access to newly developed varieties in order to integrate the varieties into their informal seed systems and adapt them to the local needs and circumstances. This interdependency is often forgotten. We tend to think only about commercial breeders who need access to the gene pool developed by farmers in informal systems, for example, to help them develop varieties adapted to climate change. But there is also a need for farmers to access the formal seed systems on the basis of customary use, often for very similar purposes.

The Nagoya protocol makes an interesting point, stating that “Parties … shall, as far as possible, not restrict the customary use and exchange of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge within and amongst indigenous and local communities in accordance with the objectives of the Convention.” To me, this proves that the Protocol recognises that farmer seed systems are important to promote biodiversity and that the Protocol could be used to support the rights of farmers to freely use, save, exchange and sell seeds.

Is monetary benefit sharing enough?

With regards to Farmers’ Rights, it is very important to mention that it is not enough to support farmers engaged in the conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources by the benefit sharing fund for the use of the genetic resources they developed. They especially need the legal space to use and further develop traditional knowledge and genetic resources. This is where the question of national seed laws comes in, which in some countries restrict the commercialisation of farmer seeds, or plant variety protection and patents which in many cases restrict or prohibit the use, exchange or sale of farm saved seed or other propagation material. This could have a negative impact on the further development of traditional knowledge, while at the same time depriving farmers of an essential tool to manage their seeds and ensure food security.

A good example of how plant variety protection should not develop is the 1991 revision of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV ’91). UPOV does not take into account the interdependence of both the formal and informal systems. While UPOV ‘91 protects the innovations developed in the formal seed system, at the same time it destroys another innovation and seed system: the farmer seed system. This is why the Berne Declaration opposes its implementation. In summary, we have to look for a kind of system which protects one kind of innovation without destroying the other. Such a system should give access to both systems and allow all parties to access each other’s results.

Interview by Robin Pistorius

Between 2009 and 2012 Francois Meienberg acted as joint managing director for the Berne Declaration. To learn more, visit www.evb.ch

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Formal access and benefit sharing processes are anchored in what may termed the international ‘ABS regime’, which consists of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its Nagoya Protocol and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA). Both the CBD and the Treaty recognise the role of indigenous groups and family farmers in the conservation and sustainable use of (agro)biodiversity, and both support ABS arrangements, albeit differently. The contributions in this special issue demonstrate that despite the existence of this ABS regime, indigenous groups and family farmers have so far received very limited material and immaterial support from it, due to political, legal and bureaucratic complexities and hurdles, lack of national implementation capacities, and costly operational procedures. At the same time, much can be learned from traditional and newly emerging forms of farmer-centred principles and practices for access and benefit sharing.

Collaboration

The experiences presented here provide valuable insights about what elements of a formal ABS system may work for family farmers. Central to effective ABS arrangements are the practices of collaboration of farmer networks and community seed banks with state actors or professional breeders – in some cases under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, and only recently emerging under the Treaty.

A fundamental factor of success is putting farmers at the centre of such collaborations, such as in the case of seed development and improvement seen in China. ‘Professional’ breeders from the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (the national public breeding institute) and the Guangxi Maize Research Institute are working with farmers to improve an open pollinated maize variety. Farmers benefit through the recognition of their expertise, improved availability of and access to quality seeds from both institutes, income generated from seed production and marketing, and the provision of scientific and technical knowhow through collaboration with the formal seed sector.

A fundamental factor of success is putting farmers at the centre of ABS collaborations with state actors or professional breeders

Under certain circumstances, access and benefit sharing mechanisms can also be established through collaborations of private parties and farmers, as the unique participatory plant breeding tradition based on farmer-selected potato varieties in the Netherlands demonstrates. It is important to note however that a major reason for the success of this initiative is the specific historical context of the Dutch agricultural sector. Decades of public investment in breeding has fostered relationships between farmers and public and private sector breeders.

Collaborations are also successful when they make collections of genetic resources of key crops accessible to family farmers, especially in cases where farmers have little access to quality seed. The initiative of coffee farmers in Costa Rica demonstrates the positive impact of facilitated access of farmers and breeders to the germplasm of horticultural crops. Access to diverse crops is of strategic importance to farmers as it enhances their resilience to climate change and other shocks. This experience points to the need to include horticultural food crops in the multilateral system of the Treaty.

Local community organisations

This publication furthermore highlights how local community organisations can and must play a leading role in the maintenance of the rich bio-cultural heritage embodied in local varieties. State authorities can support such civil society networks in the construction of seed security systems that allow family farmers to build their own food and nutrition strategies as well as increasing their resilience.

An example comes from Paraíba, Brazil, where the state government launched a seed bank policy in order to reinforce existing community seed banks, and donated stocks of seeds as an incentive for communities to construct new seed banks. When local varieties became formally recognised by the national government in 2003, the door was opened to more progressive innovations in the government seed programme. This could only happen through coordinated efforts of farmer networks, government institutions and scientists.

Simplifying the system

Research and capacity building initiatives, such as a Bioversity-led project in eight countries, make an effort to identify ways to strengthen the usefulness of ITPGRFA for farmers. Although significant progress has been made, the project reveals that progress in national implementation of ABS regulation under the Treaty is modest, especially with regards to benefit sharing. In an interview, François Meienberg echoes this observation, noting that under the Treaty’s Benefit Sharing Fund to date no mandatory payment has been made that would allow the sharing of benefits with farmers. This can be considered an injustice created by the system.

François Meienberg proposes to simplify the system: corporations that want to access genetic resources under the multilateral system should contribute a fixed benefit sharing payment on an annual basis. Despite the shortcomings, the Treaty remains important as it offers a legal basis to compel industrial agriculture to repay its dues whenever it sells seeds in a member country, as argued by Guy Kastler. The time has come to make concrete proposals to improve implementation of the Treaty.

Self-organised mechanisms

What emerges from the various contributions is that self-organised access and benefit sharing mechanisms can be highly effective for family farmers. Examples are innovative farmer-led seed banking and plant breeding initiatives. They are often based on long standing customary practices and enable family farmers to develop, exchange, sell and use traditional and region specific seed varieties.

In some cases, community seed banks provide an alternative to an ABS regime and may be more effective in protecting biodiversity and encouraging farmers to contribute to the genepool than the formal system. This is the case in India, where Farmers’ Rights are embedded in national law, but implementation poses challenges because of the regulations on trade related aspects of intellectual property rights. In this context of an emerging ABS regime, the TheruBeedi Seed Bank turns out to be very effective in ensuring access and benefit sharing for family farmers. This is also true in Zimbabwe, where smallholder farmers hardly benefit from formal ABS agreements. The Community Technology Development Trust supports alternative mechanisms that have resulted in a substantial increase of farmers’ access to seed diversity and their ability to share in the benefits of the continuing cycles of seed conservation.

Similarly, in the Ecuadorian provinces of Bolivar, Chimborazo and Cotopaxi, family farmers are creating new initiatives and capacity to conserve and use the biodiversity on their farmland through agroecological practices. They are gaining greater access to and control over their biological resources while increasing resilience and food sovereignty. Women in particular have gained greater appreciation within their communities due to their abilities to conserve and improve varieties and seeds and maintain an informal culture of free access and sharing of seed through a mechanism referred to as ‘pass the gift’. In these initiatives, concepts of distributive justice, reciprocity and equity are some of the guiding principles used by family farmers for access and benefit sharing.

Rooting the system

It turns out that access and benefit sharing is a highly complex matter, especially when it comes to supporting family farmers. We may conclude here that the success of an ABS system not only depends on creating fair and effective institutions and rules, but most of all on learning from and strengthening existing (and sometimes longstanding) ABS-mechanisms at a local or regional level. Family farmers can collaborate in their own way, developing their own access and benefit sharing mechanisms. Research and public institutions can play a important role by strengthening them, either through collaborations or through formal policy, which can be beneficial for all parties involved.

In this sense, it is notable that new civil society networks are emerging to ensure access and benefit sharing for family farmers, be it in the form of seed networks, farmer communities, or the agroecology movement. In the light of a trend towards legislation that could severely undermine farmer seed systems, such as is occurring in Africa, these networks at local, national and even global levels hold great promise for ensuring that farmers can continue to be the world’s custodians of genetic resources. The ‘formal’ ABS system could be more effective for family farmers if it becomes firmly rooted in such networks- both longstanding and newly emerging community based seed networks.

Robin Pistorius, Janneke Bruil and Ronnie Vernooy are the editors of the special issue of Farming Matters: Access and benefit sharing of genetic resources. Making it work for family farmers.

Robin Pistorius (pistorius@facts-of-life.nl) is an independent consultant and guest lecturer at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Janneke Bruil (j.bruil@ileia.org) is Coordinator Learning and Advocacy at ILEIA, the Centre for learning on sustainable agriculture in Wageningen, the Netherlands.
Ronnie Vernooy (r.vernooy@cgiar.org) is Genetic Resources Policy Specialist at Bioversity International, Italy

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